Microblogs are increasingly exploited for predicting prices and traded volumes of stocks in nancial markets. However, it has been demonstrated that much of the content shared in microblogging platforms is created and publicized by bots and spammers. Yet, the presence (or lack thereof) and the impact of fake stock microblogs has never systematically been investigated before. Here, we study 9M tweets related to stocks of the 5 main nancial markets in the US. By comparing tweets with nancial data from Google Finance, we highlight important characteristics of Twi er stock microblogs. More importantly, we uncover a malicious practicereferred to as cashtag piggybacking -perpetrated by coordinated groups of bots and likely aimed at promoting low-value stocks by exploiting the popularity of high-value ones. Among the ndings of our study is that as much as 71% of the authors of suspicious nancial tweets are classi ed as bots by a state-of-the-art spambot detection algorithm. Furthermore, 37% of them were suspended by Twi er a few months a er our investigation. Our results call for the adoption of spam and bot detection techniques in all studies and applications that exploit user-generated content for predicting the stock market. 
INTRODUCTION
e exploitation of user-generated content in microblogs for the prediction of real-world phenomena, has recently gained huge momentum [51] . An important application domain is that of nance, and in particular, stock market prediction. Indeed, a number of works developed algorithms and tools for extracting valuable information (e.g., sentiment scores) from microblogs and proved capable of predicting prices and traded volumes of stocks in nancial markets [11] . Notably, nance is increasingly relying on this information through the development of automatic trading systems.
Contributions
In a recent investigation [21] , we reported the rst preliminary evidence of the presence of nancial spam in stock microblogs, raising serious concerns over the reliability of such information. Here, we deepen our previous analyses by performing a number of additional experiments on co-occurring cashtags, on nancial markets, and on suspicious users. Speci cally, we extend our previous work with the following novel and unpublished contributions:
• we analyze co-occurring cashtags in nancial tweets by focusing on their industrial and economic classi cation. In detail, we show that co-occurrences of stocks in suspicious tweets are not motivated by the fact that those stocks belong to the same industrial or economic sectors ( § 5.2); • since real-world relatedness (as expressed by industrial classi cation) is not a plausible explanation for co-occurring stocks, we then turn our a ention to market capitalization. We demonstrate that, in suspicious tweets, high capitalization companies co-occur with low capitalization ones. Moreover, we show that this large di erence can not be explained by the intrinsic characteristics of our dataset, but it is rather the consequence of an external action ( § 5.3); • we compare the social and nancial importance of investigated companies, highlighting that stocks of one speci c market (OTCMKTS) feature a suspiciously high social importance Summarizing, this study moves in the direction of investigating the presence of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs, thus paving the way for the development of intelligent nancial-spam ltering techniques. To reach our goal, we rst collect a rich dataset comprising 9M tweets posted between May and September 2017, discussing stocks of the 5 main nancial markets in the US. We enrich our dataset by collecting nancial information from Google Finance about the 30,032 companies mentioned in our tweets. Cross-checking discussion pa erns on Twi er against o cial data from Google Finance uncovers anomalies in tweets related to some low-value companies. Further investigation of this issue reveals a large-scale speculative campaign -which we refer to as cashtag piggybacking -perpetrated by coordinated groups of bots and aimed at promoting low-value stocks by exploiting the popularity of high-value ones. Finally, we analyze a small subset of authors of suspicious tweets with state-of-the-art bot detection techniques, identifying 71% (18, 509 accounts) of them as bots.
Cashtag piggybacking
Results of our study uncover a large presence of bot accounts in stock microblogs on Twi er. More speci cally, we thoroughly document a practice aimed at promoting low-cap stocks (mainly OTCMKTS stocks) by exploiting the popularity of high-cap ones.
We name this novel kind of spam as cashtag piggybacking, by borrowing the concept of piggyback 3 from the eld of computer networks [55] . In many network protocols, a sender node is allowed to deliver short messages (e.g., ACKs to previous packets) to a receiver node, without sending a dedicated packet. In fact, the sender can postpone the short message until a new packet must be sent. At this time, the sender piggybacks (i.e., adds) the message as part of the outgoing packet. In network protocols, piggybacking allows to increase the e ciency in communications [55] . Indeed, fewer packets are sent, since small amounts of information can be sent "on top of the shoulders" of other packets.
Within the context of stock microblogs, we show that coordinated groups of bots piggyback some low-value stocks "on top of the shoulders" of other high-value stocks. Hence, the cashtag piggybacking name.
Roadmap
e remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant related work in stock market prediction from social media, and in spam and bot detection. en, Section 3 describes the dataset used in this study. In Section 4 we brie y provide an overview of the characteristics of our dataset and we describe the methodology adopted to identify suspicious tweets. In Section 5 we analyze suspicious tweets and nancial markets from several viewpoints. Instead, in Section 6 we turn our a ention to the authors of the suspicious tweets, looking for bots among them. Section 1.2 gives the motivations and de nition of the newly identi ed cashtag piggybacking spam campaign. Section 7 provides a critical discussion of our results, and nally, Section 8 draws conclusions and highlights some promising directions for future research and experimentation.
RELATED WORK
Since no study has previously addressed bot activity in stock microblogs, this section is organized so as to separately survey previous work either related to the exploitation of user-generated content for nancial purposes, or to spam and bot characterization.
Finance and social media
Works in this eld are based on the idea underlying the Hong-Page theorem [32] . Such theorem, when cast in the nancial domain, states that user-generated messages about a company's future prospects provide a rich and diverse source of information, in contrast to what the small number of traditional nancial analysts can o er.
Starting from the general assumption of the Hong-Page theorem, much e ort has been devoted towards the detection of correlations between metrics extracted from social media posts and stock market prices. In particular, sentiment metrics have been widely used as a predictor for stock prices and other economic indicators [10, 15, 27, 30, 47, 54] . e primary role played by the sentiment of the users as a nancial predictor is also testi ed by the interest in developing domain-speci c sentiment classi ers for the nancial domain [16, 53] . Others have instead proposed to exploit the overall volume of tweets about a company [45] and the topology of stock networks [49] as predictors of nancial performance. Speci cally, authors of [45] envisioned the possibility to automatically buy or sell stocks based on the presence of a peak in the volume of tweets. However, subsequent work [65] evaluated the informativeness of sentiment-and volume-derived predictors, showing that the sentiment of tweets contains signi cantly more information for predicting stock prices than just their volume. e role of in uencers in social media has also been identi ed as a strong contributing factor to the formation of market trends [13] . Others have instead used weblogs for studying the relationships between di erent companies [39] . In detail, co-occurrences of stock mentions in weblogs have been exploited to create a graph of companies, which was subsequently clustered. Authors have veri ed that companies belonging to the same clusters feature strong correlations in their stock prices. is methodology can be employed for market prediction and as a portfolio-selection method, which has been shown to outperform traditional strategies based on company sectors or historical stock prices.
Another line of research focused on the exploitation of social media content for monitoring and predicting rm equity value. As an example, the study in [63] investigated the e ect of social media and conventional media, their relative importance, and their inter-relatedness on short-term rm equity value prediction. Findings indicated that social media has a stronger relationship with rm equity value than conventional media, while social and conventional media have a strong interaction e ect on stock performance. Similarly, in [44] authors focused on the e ects of social media-derived metrics compared with conventional online company behavioral metrics. Results derived from autoregressive models suggested that social media-derived metrics (e.g., weblogs and consumer ratings) are signi cant leading indicators of rm equity value. Even more interestingly, conventional online behavioral metrics (Google searches and Web tra c) have a signi cant yet substantially weaker predictive relationship with rm equity value than social media metrics. Another study [43] from the same authors assessed the extent to which "consumer buzz", in the form of user-generated reviews, recommendations, and blog posts, in uence rm value. Results support the dynamic relationships of buzz and Web tra c with rm value, and the related mediation e ects of buzz and tra c. e study also uncovered signi cant market competition e ects, including e ects of both a rm's own and its rivals' buzz and tra c.
Nowadays, results of studies such as those brie y surveyed in this section are leveraged for the development of automatic trading systems that are largely fed with social media-derived information [22] . As a consequence, such automatic systems can potentially su er severe problems caused by large quantities of ctitious posts. As discussed in the next section, the presence of social bots -and of the fake content they produce -is so widespread as to represent a serious, tangible threat to these, and other, systems [29] .
Spam and bots in social media
Since our study is aimed at verifying the presence and the impact of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs, in this section we focus on discussing previous work about the characterization and detection of spam and bots in social media.
Many developers of spammer accounts make use of bots in order to simultaneously and continuously post a great deal of spam content. is is one of the reasons why, despite bots being in rather small numbers when compared to legitimate users, they nonetheless have a profound impact on content popularity and activity in social media [1, 29] . In addition, bots are driven so as to act in a coordinated and synchronized way, thus amplifying their e ects [48, 64] . Another problem with bots is that they evolve over time, in order to evade established detection techniques [57, 60] . Hence, newer bots o en feature advanced characteristics that make them way harder to detect with respect to older ones. Recently, a general-purpose overview of the landscape of automated accounts was presented in [25] . is work testi es the emergence of a new wave of social bots, capable of mimicking human behavior and interaction pa erns in social media be er than ever before. A subsequent study [19] compared "traditional" and "evolved" bots in Twi er, and demonstrated that the la er are almost completely undetected by platform administrators. Moreover, a crowdsourcing campaign showed that even tech savvy users are incapable of accurately identifying the evolved bots.
Since bots and spammers evolved, pu ing in place complex mechanisms to evade existing detection systems, scholars and platform administrators tried to keep pace by proposing powerful techniques based on pro le [4, 17, 42] , posting [6, 41, 59] , and network [2, 28, 35, 61] characteristics of the accounts. e study presented in [19] however demonstrated that also the majority of these bot detection techniques, which are based on o -the-shelf machine learning algorithms applied for analyzing of one account at a time, are unable to e ectively detect the evolved bots. In order to overcome this limitation a recent stream of research proposed ad-hoc detection techniques for the collective analysis of groups of accounts, rather than single accounts [18, 20, 34, 36, 37, 62] . ese techniques achieved be er detection results than previous ones [19] , and represent nowadays the last bulwark against pervasive malicious accounts in social media.
However, the ba le is far from over. Indeed, given this worrying picture, it is not surprising that bots have recently proven capable of in uencing the public opinion for many crucial topics [7, 8, 24] and in many di erent ways, such as by spreading fake news [52] or by arti cially in ating the popularity of certain posts [9] and public characters [17] . e combination of automatic trading systems feeding on social media data and the pervasive presence of spam and bots, motivates our investigation on the presence of spam and bots in stock microblogs. Moreover, the nancial domain has already been proven to have peculiar characteristics with respect to many information processing tasks (e.g., ranking [14] and ltering [56] content, expert nding [58] , etc.) so as to require ad-hoc analyses, such as the one carried out in this work.
DATASET
Our dataset for this study is composed of: (i) stock microblogs collected from Twi er, and (ii) nancial information collected from Google Finance. 
Twi er data collection
Twi er users follow the convention of tagging stock microblogs with so-called cashtags. e cashtag of a company is composed of a dollar sign followed by its ticker symbol (e.g., $AAPL is the cashtag of Apple, Inc.). Figure 1 shows two sample tweets with the $AAPL, $WMT, and $AMZN cashtags. Similarly to hashtags, cashtags are visually highlighted on Twi er's interface can be used as an e cient mean to lter content and to collect data about given companies [31] . For this reason, we based our Twi er data collection on an o cial list of cashtags. Speci cally, we rst downloaded a list of 6,689 stocks traded on the most important US markets (e.g., NASDAQ, NYSE) from the o cial NASDAQ Web site 4 . en, we collected all tweets shared between May and September 2017, containing at least one cashtag from the list. Data collection from Twi er has been carried out by exploiting Twi er's Streaming APIs 5 . A er our 5 months data collection, we ended up with ∼9M tweets (of which 22% are retweets), posted by ∼2.5M distinct users, as shown in Table 1 .
As a consequence of our data collection strategy, every tweet in our dataset contains at least one cashtag from the starting list. However, many collected tweets contain more than one cahstag, many of which are related to companies not included in our starting list. Indeed, overall we collected data about 30,032 companies traded across 5 di erent markets.
Financial data collection
We enriched our Twi er dataset by collecting nancial information about each of the 30,032 companies found in our tweets. Financial information have been collected from public company data hosted on Google Finance 6 . Among collected nancial information, is the market capitalization (market cap) of a company and its industrial classi cation. e capitalization is the total dollar market value of a company. For a given company i, it is computed as the share price P(s i ) times the number of outstanding shares |s i |:
In our study, we take the market cap of a company into account, since it allows us to compare the nancial value of that company with its social media popularity and engagement 7 . In Table 1 we report the median capitalization of the companies for each considered market. As shown, important markets such as NYSE and NASDAQ trade, on average, stocks with higher capitalization than those traded in minor markets.
Industrial classi cation is expressed via the omson Reuters Business Classi cation 8 (TRBC). As shown in Figure 2 , TRBC is a 5-level hierarchical sector and industry classi cation, widely used in the nancial domain for computing sector-speci c indices. At the topmost (coarse-grained) level TRBC classi es companies into 10 economic sectors, while at the lowest ( ne-grained) level companies are divided into 837 di erent activities. A few examples of the TRBC industrial classi cation are reported in Table 2 . In our study, we compare companies belonging to the same category, across all 5 levels of TRBC. 
ANALYSIS OF STOCK MICROBLOGS

Dataset overview
Surprisingly, the vast majority (76%) of companies mentioned in our dataset do not belong to the NASDAQ list and are traded in OTCMKTS, as shown in Table 1 . Having so many OTCMKTS companies in our dataset is already an interesting nding, considering that our data collection grounded on a list of high-capitalization (high-cap) companies. OTCMKTS is a US nancial market for over-the-counter transactions, and thus it has far less stringent requirements than those needed from NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSEARCA, and NYSEMKT. For this reason, many small companies opt to be traded in OTCMKTS instead of the more requiring markets. However, in addition to small-cap companies, OTCMKTS also trades American depositary receipts (ADRs) 9 , which allow to trade in US markets the stocks of non-US companies, otherwise only traded in other foreign markets (e.g., stocks of Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. would only be traded in the Korea Exchange). OTCMKTS also trades Convertible Preferred stocks 10 , which are a particular kind of stocks that give more guarantees to investors with respect to common stocks. Other types of assets might be traded in this market. In our study, we do not discriminate between di erent types of assets traded in OTCMKTS and we rely on the nancial information contained in Google Finance, irrespectively of the kind of traded stocks.
us, from a company viewpoint, our dataset is dominated by stocks traded in OTCMKTS. However, OTCMKTS companies play a marginal role from both a nancial and social viewpoint, having low median capitalization and small numbers of tweets, the vast majority of which are retweets. In contrast, companies from NASDAQ and NYSE have high capitalization and are mentioned in many tweets, with low percentage of retweets.
In the following, we report on some of the general characteristics of our dataset. Figure 3a shows a cashtag-cloud representing the most tweeted companies in our dataset. In gure, cashtags are color-coded so as to visually highlight companies traded in di erent markets. e most tweeted companies in our dataset are in line with recent trends (e.g., the $BTC (Bitcoin) and $ETH (Ethereum) cryptocurrencies) and with ndings of previous works [3, 31] (e.g., $AAPL leading the way, followed by $AMZN, $FB, and $TSLA). Notably, no company from OTCMKTS appears among top mentioned companies, but instead they play a rather marginal role. Figure 3b shows the mean volume of tweets collected per hour. e largest surge of tweets occurs between 10am and 5pm (US Eastern 0:10 S. Cresci et al. time), which almost completely overlaps with the opening hours of the New York Stock Exchange (9:30am to 4pm). is fact further highlights the strong relation between stock microblogs and the real-world stock market. Finally, as previously introduced, many stock microblogs contain more than one cashtag (e.g., the right-hand side tweet in Figure 1 ). Figure 3c shows the distribution of distinct cashtags per tweet, with a mean value of 2 cashtags/tweet.
Stock time series analysis
In order to uncover possible malicious behaviors related to stock microblogs, we carry out a negrained analysis of our data. Speci cally, we build and analyze the hourly time series of each of the 6,689 stocks downloaded from the NASDAQ Web site. Given a stock i, its time series is de ned as
, with s i, j being the number of tweets that mentioned the stock i during the hour j. Figure 4 shows some examples of our stock time series, for 12 highly tweeted stocks across 3 markets (NASDAQ, NYSE, and NYSEMKT). As shown in gure, stock time series are characterized by long time spans over which tweet discussion volumes remain rather low, occasionally interspersed by large discussion spikes. is behavior is consistent with what has been previously observed in Twi er for other phenomena (e.g., communication pa erns related to emergency events [5] ). Indeed, the bursty an spiky characteristics of social communications have been recently explained as a direct consequence of human dynamics [38] .
To give a be er characterization of this phenomenon we ran a simple anomaly detection technique on all the 6,689 time series. As typically done in many time series analysis tasks, our anomaly detection technique is designed so as to detect a peak p i, j in a time series s i i the tweet volume for the hour j deviates from the mean tweet volumes i by a number K of standard deviations:
e parameter K determines the number of peaks found by our anomaly detection technique. In fact, a bigger K implies that a larger deviation from the mean is needed in order to detect a peak. Figure 5 shows the number of peaks detected in our time series, as a function of the parameter K. For the remainder of our analysis we set K = 10, which represents a trade-o between the height of considered peaks and the number of peaks to analyze. is choice of K results in 1,926 peaks detected in our time series. Time series depicted in Figure 4 also show mean values (cyan solid line) and the 10σ threshold (red solid line) above which peaks are detected.
Next, we are interested in analyzing the tweets that generated the peaks (henceforth, peak tweets). In detail, a peak p i, j is composed of a set of tweets t i, j , such that each tweet t ∈ t i, j contains the cashtag related to the stock i and has been posted during the hour j (i.e., the peak hour):
us, for each of the 1,926 peaks p i, j we analyze the corresponding set of tweets t i, j . We nd out that, on average, 60% of tweets t ∈ t are retweets. In other words, the peaks identi ed by our anomaly detection technique are largely composed of retweets. In addition, considering that our time series have hourly granularity, those retweets also occurred within a rather limited time span, in a bursty fashion. is nding is particularly interesting also considering that in all our dataset, we had only 23% retweets, versus 60% measured for peak tweets.
We also analyzed tweets t ∈ t by considering the co-occurrences of stocks. From this analysis we see that tweets t ∈ t typically contain many more cashtags than tweets t t. e cashtags that co-occur in peak tweets seem unrelated, and the authors of those tweets don't provide further information to explain such co-occurrences. As an example, Figure 6 shows 4 of such suspicious tweets. In gure, in every tweet, a few cashtags of high-capitalization (high-cap) stocks co-occur with many cashtags of low-cap stocks.
e distributions of the number of retweets per tweet, and of the number of cashtags per tweet, are shown in gures 7a and 7b respectively. In gure, the distributions are shown with beanplots and allow to compare values measured for the whole dataset (green-colored), with those measured only in peak tweets (light blue-colored). e characteristics of peak tweets previously highlighted -that is, the percentage of retweets and the number of co-occurring cashtags -di er signi cantly from those measured for the whole dataset. e reason for this peculiar phenomenon could be related to some real-world news or event, that motivates the surge of retweets and the co-occurrences of di erent cashtags. However, such di erences could also be the consequence of a shady, malicious activity. Indeed, there have already been reports of large groups of bots that coordinately and simultaneously alter popularity and engagement metrics of Twi er users and content [9, 26] . In particular, mass retweets have been identi ed as one mean to arti cially increase the popularity of certain content [19] . 
ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL SPAM
In this section we evaluate di erent hypotheses in order to thoroughly understand the reasons why so many seemingly-unrelated cashtags co-occur in peak tweets, and the reason for the high percentage of retweets in peaks.
Visualizing co-occurring stocks
We begin by computing and visualizing the graph of co-occurring stocks for our whole dataset, and by comparing it with the graph of stocks that co-occur only in peak tweets. Our co-occurrence graphs represent the collective interconnections of stocks based on their paired presence within tweets. For the sake of clarity, graphs in gures 8 and 9 only show stocks whose degree ≥ 95. Figure 8 shows the co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in all tweets of our dataset. Stocks are colored according to their market. As shown, the core of the graph is mainly composed of stocks belonging to NASDAQ (blue-colored) and NYSEARCA (green-colored) markets. In addition to stocks of the 5 markets already introduced, Figure 8 also shows cashtags related to cryptocurrencies (yellow-colored). is is because in Twi er cryptocurrencies are labeled with cashtags, similarly to stocks. However, cryptocurrencies are not traded in regulated nancial markets and hence in gure they are labeled as OTHERS. As shown, cryptocurrencies represent a large cluster of our graph, with a few highly important nodes such as Bitcoin ($BTC) and Ethereum ($ETH).
ite intuitively, cryptocurrencies are however well separated from the rest of the graph, meaning that they rarely co-occur in tweets with stocks traded in nancial markets. Finally, in Figure 8 OTCMKTS stocks (red-colored) cover only a small and peripheral portion of the graph.
In Figure 9 we recreate the co-occurrence graph by only considering peak tweets. is time, the core of the graph is mainly composed of stocks from NASDAQ (blue-colored) and OTCMKTS (redcolored). More precisely, OTCMKTS stocks are not in the periphery of the graph, but instead are well interconnected with NASDAQ stocks. In addition, the degree of many OTCMKTS stocks is comparable to that of NASDAQ stocks. Intuitively, this means that OTCMKTS stocks appear very frequently in peak tweets, and that they o en co-occur in such tweets with NASDAQ stocks.
Analysis of co-occurring stocks by industrial classification
Previous work have investigated the co-occurrences of stocks in weblogs and their relation to real-world events. In particular, authors of [39] applied a clustering technique over a stock cooccurrences matrix, identifying a number of clusters containing highly correlated stocks. Results of this study highlighted that stocks that co-occur in blog articles as a consequence of real-world events, belong to the same industrial sector. In other words, results of [39] support the assumption that stocks that legitimately appear related between one another in weblogs (or microblogs), are also related in real-world. us, as a consequence of common sense and previous studies, it would be suspicious for some stocks to appear related (i.e., co-occurring) in microblogs, without being related (i.e., belonging to the same industrial sector) in real-world.
To evaluate whether co-occurring stocks in peak tweets of our dataset are also related in realworld, we exploited the TRBC classi cation previously introduced in Section 3.2. Speci cally, for each tweet t ∈ t we measured the extent to which the stocks mentioned in t belong to the same (or to di erent) TRBC class(es), for all the 5 hierarchical levels of TRBC. As a measurement for the di erence in TRBC classes across stocks in a tweet, we leveraged the notion of entropy. us, given a tweet t ∈ t containing X distinct cashtags (i.e., each one associated to a di erent company) and the level j of TRBC with N j classes, we rst built the list of TRBC classes of the X companies mentioned in t:
en, we computed the normalized Shannon entropy of the TRBC classes in c, for TRBC level j, as: where p c i is the empirical probability that TRBC class i appears in c, and H max (j) is the maximum theoretical entropy for TRBC level j: 2 1 X Because of the normalization term, 0 ≤ H c norm ≤ 1. us, H c norm ∼ 0 implies companies of the same industrial sector, while H c norm ∼ 1 implies unrelated companies. Intuitively, considering that the 5 TRBC levels are hierarchical, we expect H c norm to be higher (i.e., more heterogeneity) for ne-grained TRBC levels, while we expect H c norm to be lower (i.e., less heterogeneity) for the topmost, coarse-grained TRBC level. Results of this experiment, with TRBC level j ranging from the lowest level 1 to the topmost level 5, are shown in Figure 10a . For every TRBC level, a boxplot and a sca erplot show the distribution of normalized entropy measured for each peak tweet. As expected, H c norm actually lowers when considering coarse-grained TRBC levels, as shown by the median value of the boxplot distributions. Nonetheless, median H c norm > 0.5 for all 5 TRBC levels, meaning that co-occurring companies in peak tweets are largely unrelated. Figure 10b shows the result of the same measurement carried out on all tweets of our dataset, rather than only on peak tweets. Interestingly, the entropy measured in all our dataset is smaller than that measured for peak tweets, for all 5 TRBC levels. In turn, this means that co-occurring companies in peak tweets are overall less related than those co-occurring in tweets not belonging to a peak. Di erences between the entropies measured for peak tweets and for all the dataset are statistically signi cant for all 5 TRBC levels, with all p-values < 0.01 according to a 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Notably, even for ne-grained TRBC levels, there is a minority of peak tweets for which we measured H c norm = 0. ese tweets might actually contain mentions to companies related also in real-world.
Summarizing, the results of this experiment seem to suggest that, overall, co-occurrences of stocks in peak tweets are not motivated by the fact that stocks belong to the same industrial or economic sectors.
Analysis of co-occurring stocks by market capitalization
Since real-world relatedness (as expressed by industrial classi cation) is not a plausible explanation for co-occurring stocks in our dataset, we now turn our a ention to market capitalization. We are interested in evaluating whether a relation exists between the capitalization of co-occurring stocks. For instance, legitimate peak tweets could mention multiple stocks with similar capitalization. Conversely, malicious users could try to exploit the popularity of high-cap stocks by mentioning them together with low-cap ones.
One way to evaluate the similarity (or dissimilarity) in market capitalization of co-occurring stocks is by computing statistical measures of spread, standard deviation (std.) being a straightforward one. us, for each peak tweet t ∈ t we computed the std. of the capitalization of all companies mentioned in t. Results are shown in Figure 11 , where boxplots and sca erplots are depicted as a function of the number of distinct companies mentioned in tweets. en, in order to understand whether the measured spread in capitalization is due to the intrinsic characteristics of our dataset (i.e., the underlying statistical distribution of capitalization) or to other factors, we compared mean values of our empirical measurements with the result of a bootstrap. For bootstrapping the std. of tweets that mention x companies, we randomly sampled 10, 000 groups of x companies from our dataset. en, for each of the 10, 000 random groups we computed the std. of the capitalization of the x companies of the group. Finally, we averaged results over the 10, 000 groups. is procedure is executed for x = 2, 3, . . . , 22, thus covering the whole extent of Figure 11 .
Results in gure highlight a large empirical std. between the capitalization of co-occurring companies. is means that in our peak tweets, high-cap companies co-occur with low-cap ones. Moreover, the measured std. is larger than that obtained with the bootstrap. In turn, this means that the large di erence in capitalization can not be explained by the intrinsic characteristics of our dataset, but it is rather the consequence of an external action. e previous experiment already lead to interesting results. However, it does not allow to draw insights into the possibly di erent characteristics of stocks traded in di erent markets. In order to evaluate the capitalization of co-occurring stocks, for stocks of di erent markets, we evaluated the assortativity of the co-occurrence graph of stocks mentioned in peak tweets. e graph used for this experiment is the one depicted in Figure 9 . e assortativity is computed on the capitalization of the nodes (i.e., companies) of the graph, rather than on their degree as it is typically done with this kind of analysis.
Speci cally, for every stock, we compare its capitalization with the weighted mean of the capitalizations of its neighbors in the graph. e weighting factor is based on the number of co-occurrences between stocks (i.e., the weight of the edge in the co-occurrence graph). Results are presented in Figure 12 as sca erplots with a linear t, and are grouped by market. In gure 12 we only show plots for NASDAQ, NYSE, and OTCMKTS since they represent the most interesting results. As shown, stocks of NASDAQ and NYSE, the most important markets of our dataset, are assortative (slopes equal 0.44 and 0.55). In other words, high-cap stocks of NASDAQ and NYSE typically co-occur with other high-cap stocks. is behavior is consistent with what one would intuitively expect. Conversely, OTCMKTS stocks are almost non-assortative at all, as demonstrated by slope ∼ 0. It is also important to note that while the assortativity of NASDAQ and NYSE stocks is higher when considering peak tweets instead of all the tweets of our dataset, for OTCMKTS stocks we measure the opposite behavior. is means that in peak tweets OTCMKTS stocks co-occur with high-cap stocks more o en than when considering all our dataset.
Social and financial importance
So far, we demonstrated that tweets responsible for generating peaks, mention a large number of unrelated stocks, some of which are high-cap stocks while the others are low-cap ones. Adding to these ndings, we are also interested in assessing the relation between the social and nancial importance of our 30,032 stocks. Financial importance of a stock i can be measured by its market capitalization C i . Social importance can be quanti ed as the number of times a stock is mentioned in stock microblogs. Intuitively, we expect a positive correlation between stock capitalization and mentions, meaning that high-cap stocks are mentioned more frequently than low-cap stocks. Notably, this positive relation has already been measured in a number of previous works, such as [45] , and has been leveraged for predicting stock prices. Table 3 . Rank correlation between market capitalization and number of tweets.
By exploiting our data in Table 1 we can make a rst assessment of this relation over the whole dataset and compare it with that measured for peak tweets. Speci cally, in Table 3 we report the values of 2 well-known rank correlation measures -namely, Spearman's rank correlation coe cient (ρ), and Kendall's rank correlation coe cient (τ ) -between the capitalization of a stock and the number of tweets mentioning that stock. e rank correlation is computed for all stocks of the 5 markets. When considering all our dataset, for stocks of all markets, except OTCMKTS, we nd a positive correlation con rming our previous hypothesis. Instead, stocks of OTCMKTS feature negligible rank correlations over all the dataset. Even more interestingly, the signi cant correlation measured over all the dataset for stocks of important markets almost completely disappears when only considering peak tweets. Furthermore, OTCMKTS stocks in peak tweets even feature a moderate negative correlation. In other words, results of this experiment imply that the less capitalized stocks in OTCMKTS are more likely to appear in peak tweets than the more capitalized ones, a behavior that is both counterintuitive and in contrast with results of previous works. In turn, this further highlights the presence of suspicious behaviors in peaks.
With the goal of be er evaluating the relationship between social and nancial importance of stocks appearing in peaks, we also performed an additional experiment as follows. Given a stock i and a peak p, we counted the number of times that i is mentioned in peak tweets of p. We repeated this measurement for every peak p, and we computed the median value of these measurements that represents the social importance of stock i in all peak tweets. en, for every stock, we plo ed its measurement of social importance versus that of nancial importance, and we visually grouped stocks by their market. To avoid overplo ing, we performed a bivariate (i.e., 2D) kernel density estimation, whose results are shown in Figure 13 . For the sake of clarity, we split the social-vs-nancial space into 4 sectors. Sector A (top-right) de nes a region of space with stocks having both a high social and nancial importance. Stocks in Sector B (top-le ) are characterized by high nancial importance, but low social importance. Stocks in Sector C (bo om-le ) have both low social and nancial importance, while stocks in Sector D (bo om-right) have high social importance despite low nancial importance.
By comparing stock densities of di erent markets in Figure 13 , we see that OTCMKTS stocks almost completely lay in Sector D. All other markets have their stock densities mainly laying in Sector B and Sector A. In other words, OTCMKTS stocks have a suspiciously high social importance (i.e., they are mentioned in many tweets and across many peaks), despite their low nancial importance. Results for all other markets are more intuitive, with NYSEARCA stocks achieving the best combination of social and nancial importance. Summarizing, we measured a positive relation between social and nancial importance when considering all stock microblogs shared during the 5 months of our study. However, when focusing our analysis on peaks in stock microblogs, we observed a suspicious behavior related to OTCMKTS stocks.
ANALYSIS OF SUSPICIOUS USERS
In previous sections we identi ed a wide array of suspicious phenomena related to stock microblogs. In particular, peaks in microblog conversations about high-cap stocks are lled with mentions of lowcap (mainly OTCMKTS) stocks. Such mentions can not be explained by real-world stock relatedness. Moreover, the peaks in microblog conversations are largely caused by mass retweets. Despite not having been studied before, this scenario resembles those recently discovered when investigating the activities of bots tampering with social political discussions [19, 26, 48] . Unfortunately, systems for automatically detecting spam in stock microblogs are yet to be developed. However, recent scienti c e orts lead to the development of several general-purpose bot and spam detection systems.
Digital DNA for social bot detection
In this section we employ a state-of-the-art bot and spam detection system, speci cally developed for spo ing malicious group activities, to classify suspicious users [18, 20] . e goal of this experiment is to assess whether users that shared/retweeted the suspicious peak tweets we previously identi ed, are classi ed as bots. In turn, this would bring de nitive evidence of bot activities in the stock microblogs that we analyzed. e system in [18, 20] performs bot detection in 2 steps. Firstly, it encodes the online behavior of a user into a string of characters that represents the digital DNA of the user. en, multiple digital DNA sequences, one for each user of the group under investigation, are compared between one another by means of string mining and bioinformatics algorithms. e system classi es as bots those users that have suspiciously high similarities among their digital DNA sequences. Notably, the system in [18, 20] proved capable of accurately detecting also "evolved" bots (F 1 = 0.97), such as those described in [25] .
Because of the computationally intensive analyses performed by [18, 20] , we constrained this experiment to the 100 largest peaks (i.e., those generated by the greatest number of tweets) of our dataset. Starting from those top-100 peaks, we then analyzed the 25, 957 distinct users that shared or retweeted at least one peak tweet. Behavioral information needed by the detection system to perform user classi cation have been collected by crawling the Twi er timelines of such 25, 957 users. Notably, the bot detection system classi ed as much as 18, 509 (71%) of the analyzed users as bots. Figure 14 shows 6 examples of users classi ed as bots, while Figure 15 shows some tweets of the same users. A manual analysis of a subset of bots allowed to identify characteristics shared between all the users (e.g., similar name, join date, pro le picture, etc.), supporting the hypothesis that they are part of a larger botnet. Users classi ed as bots also feature very high retweet rates (ratio of retweets over all posted tweets), thus explaining the large number of retweets in our peaks and among OTCMKTS stock microblogs.
We obtained these results by analyzing only the 100 largest detected peaks, therefore analyses of minor peaks might yield di erent results. Nonetheless, the overwhelming ratio of bots that we discovered among large peaks discussing popular stocks, raises serious concerns over the reliability of stock microblogs.
Twi er bot detection
In previous experiment we relied on a state-of-the-art bot detection technique in order to classify our accounts. Here, following a procedure originally used in [19] , we also evaluate whether Twi er itself detected and suspended the suspicious accounts that we identi ed. In fact, accounts that are suspected to perform malicious activities or that violate Twi er's terms of service, get suspended by Twi er.
To carry out this experiment we exploited Twi er's responses to API calls and, in particular, Twi er error codes 11 . Given a query to a speci c account, Twi er APIs reply with information regarding the status of the queried account. API queries to a suspended account result in Twi er issuing error code 63. Instead, for accounts that are still active, Twi er replies with the full metadata information of the account, without issuing any error.
Results of this experiment show that, out of the 25, 957 suspicious accounts, as much as 9, 490 (37%) accounts have been suspended by Twi er somewhen between November 2017 and May 2018. is result is a clear demonstration that many of the accounts responsible for creating the peaks in nancial discussions, are actually bots. It is not surprising that the digital DNA-based technique [18, 20] detected more bots than Twi er (18, 509 versus 9, 490). Indeed, it has been recently demonstrated that state-of-the-art detection techniques are more e ective than Twi er at detecting sophisticated bots [19] . Moreover, to avoid closing accounts of legitimate users by mistake, Twi er is typically conservative with its suspension policy. Finally, there is a very large overlap between the accounts suspended by Twi er and those labeled as bots via the digital DNA technique: 8, 887 out of 9, 490 accounts (∼ 94% of all Twi er suspensions).
DISCUSSION
Results of our extensive investigation highlighted the presence of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs. For the rst time, we described an advertising practice that we called cashtag piggybacking, where many nancially unimportant (low-cap) stocks are massively mentioned in microblogs together with a few nancially important (high-cap) stocks. Analyses of suspicious users suggest that the advertising practice is carried out by large groups of coordinated social bots. Considering the already demonstrated relation between social and nancial importance [45] , a possible outcome expected by perpetrators of this advertising practice is the increase in nancial importance of the low-cap stocks, by exploiting the popularity of high-cap ones.
e potential negative consequences of this new form of nancial spam are manifold. On the one hand, unaware investors (e.g., noise traders) could be lured into believing that the social importance of promoted stocks have a basis in reality. On the other hand, also the multitude of automatic trading systems that feed on social information, could be tricked into buying low value stocks. Market collapses such as the Flash Crash, or disastrous investments such as that of Cynk Technology, could occur again in the future, with dire consequences. For this reason, a favorable research avenue for the future involves quantifying the impact of social bots and microblog nancial spam in stock prices uctuations, similarly to what has already been done at the dawn of nancial e-mail spam.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst exploratory study on the presence of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs. As such, future works related to the characterization and detection of nancial spam in microblogs, are much desirable. Indeed, no automatic system for the detection of nancial spam in microblogs has been developed to date. To overcome this limitation, in our analyses we employed a general-purpose bot detection system. However, such approach hardly scales on the massive number of users, both legitimate and automated, involved in nancial discussions on microblogs. Hence, another promising direction of research involves with the development of tools and techniques for promptly detecting promoted stocks, thus avoiding the need for a cumbersome user classi cation. In addition, a strict characterization of the social bots involved in cashtag piggybacking spam campaigns (e.g., their behavior and network characteristics), is also needed.
Finally, we believe it is useful -and worrying at the same time -to demonstrate the presence of bot activity in stock microblogs. Finance thus adds to the growing list of domains recently tampered by social bots -joining the political, social, and commercial domains, to name but a few.
CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the widespread presence of social bots, we carried out the rst large-scale, systematic analysis on the presence and impact of spam and bot activity in stock microblogs. By cross-checking 9M stock microblogs from Twi er with nancial information from Google Finance, we uncovered a malicious practice aimed at promoting low-value stocks by exploiting the popularity of high-value ones. In these so-called cashtag piggybacking spam campaigns, many stocks with low market capitalization, mainly traded in OTCMKTS, are mentioned in microblogs together with a few high capitalization stocks traded in NASDAQ and NYSE. We showed that such co-occurring stocks are not related by economic and industrial sector. Moreover, the large discussion spikes about low-value stocks are due to mass, synchronized retweets. Finally, an analysis of retweeting users classi ed 71% of them as bots, and 37% of them were subsequently suspended by Twi er.
Given the severe consequences that this new form of nancial spam could have on unaware investors as well as on automatic trading systems, our results call for the prompt adoption of spam and bot detection techniques in all applications and systems that exploit stock microblogs.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
e data collection for this study is based on an o cial list of 6,689 high-cap stocks released by NASDAQ, as detailed in Section 3. As a consequence, we have complete data (e.g., the full time series) only for the 6,689 stocks of the list. Conversely, we have data about OTCMKTS stocks only if and when they co-occur with stocks of the list.
Because of this limitation in our dataset, some of our results regarding OTCMKTS stocks could be biased. In order to rule out this possibility, we carried out an additional data collection phase. Speci cally, we collected all tweets shared between June 21 and July 2 2017 (i.e., 12 days), containing at least one cashtag of an OTCMKTS stock. is data collection lasted only for 12 days because of the large number (i.e., 22,956) of cashtags that we had to monitor, each one corresponding to a search keyword of a Twi er Streaming crawler. is new dataset is not biased towards high-cap stocks and represents a clear and complete picture of Twi er discussions about OTCMKTS stocks. Of all the tweets collected that contain at least one cashtag OTCMKTS, 51% of them contain exactly one cashtag OTCMKTS.
We analyzed this dataset in the same way as the one obtained from the NASDAQ list. Speci cally, we carried out the steps described in Section 4. Figure 16 shows the number of peaks detected in the dataset about OTCMKTS stocks, as a function of the parameter K -that is, the number of standard deviations from the mean needed to detect a peak in a stock time series. As shown in gure, by adopting the threshold chosen in Section 4 (K = 10) we obtain no peaks at all. is is in sharp contrast with the result shown in Figure 5 , obtained by analyzing the dataset derived from the NASDAQ list. Indeed, the overall volume of tweets that mention only OTCMKTS stocks is very low. In other words, this means that almost no tweet at all only mentions OTCMKTS stocks, while instead OTCMKTS stocks are almost only mentioned together with some other high-cap stock. is result obtained by analyzing the complete dataset of OTCMKTS stocks further supports our ndings reported in Section 1.2.
If we lower the threshold needed to detect a peak in a stock time series from K = 10 to K = 7, we end up with 14 peaks, as shown in the examples of Figure 17 . Such peaks are generally way lower than those measured for stocks of the NASDAQ list, which are shown in Figure 4 . e 14 peaks detected in the OTCMKTS stocks dataset are still largely caused by mass retweets. Interestingly, Figure 18 shows two examples of such peak tweets. As shown in gure, the tweets contain only the $UPZS cashtag, related to the Unique Pizza & Subs Corp. company. Despite not showing the cashtag piggybacking behavior, it is clear that these tweets are still aimed at exploiting some highly popular topics, in order to publicize the $UPZS stock. Indeed, the le -hand side tweet of Figure 18 ends with the keyword "Rihanna", while the right-hand side one ends with a link to a video related to (Donald) Trump and a provocative picture. Considering that there is clearly no relation between the content of the tweets in Figure 18 and the pop singer Rihanna or the US President Donald Trump, this is just another way to piggyback a stock on top of a popular discussion topic.
Summarizing, an analysis of the OTCMKTS stocks dataset described in this section shows that OTCMKTS stocks are almost only tweeted in conjunction with other high-cap stocks. is result supports our previous ndings. Furthermore, we also uncovered a minority of OTCMKTS stocks that do not feature the cashtag piggybacking behavior, but rather that piggyback stocks on top of trending keywords.
